Cryptographic Lockbox Transaction Substrate **Extended Technical Specification (Descriptive)**

Cryptographic Lockbox Transaction Substrate

Extended Technical Specification (Descriptive)

1. System Purpose and Scope

The system defines a distributed integrity substrate for managing private, non-legible cryptographic state machines ("lockboxes") whose internal meaning is never exposed to the network.

The substrate provides:

  • verification of authorized state transitions,
  • ordering guarantees,
  • resistance to retrospective reconstruction,

while deliberately avoiding:

  • semantic interpretation,
  • identity attribution,
  • economic accounting,
  • historical narrativity.

The system is not a ledger, database, messaging system, or payment rail.

2. Architectural Layers

2.1 Separation of Concerns

The system is structured into four orthogonal layers:

  1. Lockbox Layer — private state, logic, keys
  2. Witness Layer — cryptographic proof of authorization
  3. Substrate Layer — ordering, verification, persistence
  4. Transport Layer — broadcast dissemination

Each layer operates independently and exposes no semantic leakage upward or downward.

3. Lockboxes (Private State Machines)

3.1 Internal Composition

A lockbox contains:

Private State

  • Arbitrary data blobs
  • Internal counters, flags, commitments
  • References to external encrypted resources

Logic Engine

  • Deterministic transition rules
  • Conditional execution paths
  • Optional time-based or state-based triggers

Key Material

  • Access keys
  • Destruct keys
  • Decoy keys
  • Derivation seeds

Receptor Definitions

  • Matching conditions for incoming stimuli
  • Cryptographic predicates
  • Temporal or contextual constraints

All of the above remain strictly local.

3.2 Determinism and Auditability

Lockbox logic is deterministic:

  • identical inputs always yield identical transitions,
  • non-determinism is explicitly excluded.

This ensures:

  • reproducible verification,
  • bounded witness generation,
  • integrity without interpretation.

4. Communication and Stimulus Model

4.1 Global Broadcast Semantics

All external inputs are:

  • broadcast to the entire substrate,
  • syntactically uniform,
  • indistinguishable in type and intent.

There is no:

  • addressing,
  • routing,
  • targeting,
  • or sender identity.

4.2 Receptor Evaluation

Each lockbox independently evaluates every stimulus against its receptors.

Receptor matching may include:

  • cryptographic verification (e.g., signatures, hashes),
  • shared secret validation,
  • state-dependent predicates,
  • time windows or sequence constraints.

Only matching lockboxes proceed to authorization checks.

No external observer can:

  • determine which lockboxes matched,
  • infer receptor logic,
  • detect failed matches.

5. Authorization and State Transition

5.1 Authorization Proofs

To mutate state, a lockbox must generate a cryptographic authorization proof demonstrating:

  • possession of valid internal authority,
  • compliance with internal logic,
  • correctness of transition.

The proof reveals that authorization exists, not what it represents.

5.2 Transition Commitments

Each state transition produces:

  • a new cryptographic commitment to internal state,
  • optional references to external encrypted resources.

The commitment:

  • binds future transitions,
  • prevents rollback,
  • carries no semantic payload.

6. Witness Model

6.1 Bounded Witnesses

Verification relies on bounded cryptographic witnesses:

  • fixed upper size limits,
  • constant verification complexity,
  • independent of lockbox history length.

This allows:

  • safe discarding of historical proofs,
  • predictable network load,
  • integrity without archival burden.

6.2 Witness Replacement and Collapse

Older witnesses may be:

  • replaced by newer aggregate witnesses,
  • discarded once superseded.

Integrity is preserved by:

  • chaining commitments,
  • enforcing monotonic ordering.

7. Forgetting and State Pruning

7.1 Forgetting Semantics

Lockboxes may:

  • voluntarily discard internal history,
  • collapse state into a single commitment,
  • invalidate prior witnesses.

Forgetting:

  • is irreversible,
  • does not violate integrity,
  • leaves no externally distinguishable trace.

7.2 Triggering Forgetting

Forgetting may be triggered by:

  • explicit authorized input,
  • internal thresholds,
  • time-based conditions.

The substrate does not distinguish forgetting from ordinary mutation.

8. Distribution Model

8.1 Distributed Verification

The substrate is maintained by multiple independent participants.

Each participant:

  • verifies authorization proofs,
  • enforces ordering rules,
  • stores commitments and witnesses.

Participants do not:

  • interpret lockbox meaning,
  • access private state,
  • store keys.

8.2 Absence of Central Custody

No node ever holds:

  • sufficient context to reconstruct semantics,
  • a full narrative of any lockbox's evolution.

Distribution ensures:

  • seizure yields fragments,
  • coercion yields ambiguity,
  • compromise yields no explanation.

9. External Data Integration

9.1 Off-Substrate Storage

Large data is stored:

  • externally,
  • encrypted,
  • location-agnostic.

The substrate only records:

  • cryptographic references (e.g., hashes),
  • not locations or access events.

9.2 One-Time and Conditional Keys

Lockboxes may generate keys that are:

  • single-use,
  • time-limited,
  • receptor-gated.

External data systems may:

  • enforce synchronized key invalidation,
  • prevent replay or reuse.

10. Key Semantics

10.1 Indistinguishable Keys

All keys appear identical externally.

Only internal lockbox logic determines whether a key:

  • grants access,
  • triggers destruction,
  • performs no action.

10.2 Destruction Semantics

Destruction:

  • irreversibly erases internal state,
  • produces a valid commitment,
  • is indistinguishable from benign mutation.

There is no cryptographic signal of intent.

11. Load Regulation and Environmental Pressure

11.1 Non-Economic Regulation

The system may apply:

  • computation limits,
  • bandwidth limits,
  • verification quotas.

Heavier lockboxes:

  • respond more slowly,
  • propagate fewer transitions.

Lightweight lockboxes:

  • remain responsive,
  • interact efficiently.

11.2 No Native Currency

There is:

  • no token,
  • no fee market,
  • no monetary incentive layer.

Participation is voluntary and non-extractive.

12. Security Model (Structural)

The system assumes:

  • hostile observers,
  • coercive adversaries,
  • partial compromise.

The system does not assume:

  • honest participants,
  • benevolent governance,
  • trusted infrastructure.

Security is structural, not behavioral.

13. System Boundaries

The system explicitly does not provide:

  • identity management,
  • access control semantics,
  • dispute resolution,
  • enforcement mechanisms,
  • legal compliance guarantees.

All meaning and consequences exist outside the substrate.

14. Concise Technical Characterization

A distributed, broadcast-based integrity substrate that verifies authorized transitions of private deterministic state machines using bounded cryptographic witnesses, where communication is global, reception is local, history is optional, and semantics never leave the lockbox.

Next natural documents would be either:

  • a formal model (state machines, transitions, invariants), or
  • a comparative taxonomy (how this differs from blockchains, ZK systems, secure messaging, MPC, etc.).

Those would deepen understanding further without turning this into a how-to.

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